We draw attention to two changes in management research over the past 25 years: more focus on the different contexts that constrain management action, and applications of management knowledge to non-business societal challenges. There has been much speculation but little comparative empirical research on how government quality affects what managers do. Building on theory and research from international business, organization theory and organizational behaviour we propose and test an account of the ways government capability affects organizational performance through its effects on managerial assumptions and actions. In a sample of managers working under four different governments, we find that the more capable the government the less managers depend on their personal relationships to get their work done, and these in turn mediate governments' effects on the managerial cultivation of relationships with government officials, their use of personal relationships for competitive business advantages, and their greater distrust, secrecy and withholding of information from business associates. The implications for cross-national management research and public policy for economic development are highlighted.
The study of management has matured over the past 25 years in many ways. Here we draw attention to two of these. First, research has developed from a focus on the manager as an autonomous actor to a more nuanced attention to the constraints and context within which managers do their work. Other papers in this anniversary issue also draw attention to this shift; for example, Segrestin and Hatchuel note that managers are weaker and have less latitude than is often assumed, and Whittington and colleagues and Sturdy report that managers' very identities have eroded as management becomes conflated with other professions. Second, managerial research has developed an impressive body of knowledge about how individuals organize for work, and more recently this knowledge has been extended from its initial focus on business and governmental organizations to address other societal challenges. In this special issue Broadbridge and Simpson summarize that development in addressing the challenge of combating workplace sexism, for example. In this paper we hope to advance our understanding of managers' contexts and further extend business-based managerial knowledge to important societal challenges by proposing and testing theory about how governments may affect managerial actions that are important to large, innovation-leading organizations.
Here we illustrate these two developments with a study building on growing research on the importance of governments for managerial strategies and actions (for recent reviews see Keister and Zhang, 2009; Pearce, Dibble and Klein, 2009 ). Theorizing and research on the role of governments began by documenting relationships among institutions, with little research that has tested speculations about the individual managerial actions driving these system-level effects. Here we extend that research and test a theory addressing the question: how does national government capability affect managerial actions? In keeping with the maturing of management theories, we draw on a range of social sciences: classic theories of bureaucracy, institution-based strategy theory and organizational behaviour research on interpersonal trust. We propose and test the mediating managerial and employee behaviours that foster certain firm strategies and organizational inefficiencies with important implications for innovation and economic development.
The importance of government capability in international business research is reflected in the growing number of definitions of government capability. Pearce, Dibble and Klein (2009) recently reviewed the varying ways in which governments have been categorized in organization and management research and grouped them into differences in governments' ideology and capability. Governments' ideologies vary in their policies toward firms, with governing ideologies as various as corporatist or liberal market, and relative hostility toward independent organizations. Here we focus on their second category: relative government capability.
Government capability concerns government's ability to assert its authority over its own territory. The less capable a government the less able it is to enforce the rule of law, commercial contracts and property rights, and to ensure that government officials at all levels implement policy and refrain from taking bribes or participating in other forms of corruption. North (1990) and Fligstein (1996) , among many others, describe how capable governments are necessary to the management of large complex organizations. To cite just one example, capable governments support large independent legal-rational organizations by legalizing and regulating independent financial markets, so organizations can compete for financing based on their performance, not political influence (see Evans and Rauch, 1999) . Capable governments effectively invest in education, prevent officials from capriciously interfering in management practices, and build supportive systems that reduce the cost to individual organizations of providing security and infrastructure for themselves.
There is accumulating evidence that national government capability affects firm performance. Makino, Isobe and Chan (2004) found that country differences do matter and matter significantly for firm performance. Young (2005) has detailed the efficiency-damaging effects of poorly specified property rights. Chen, Fan and Wong (2006) found that, as China has shifted to a more market-based economy, having government officials on the firm's board of directors results in poorer firm performance because firms find they must respond to government policy directives as well as market signals. Further, La Porta et al. (2002) found that better legal protections for investors lead to higher stock market valuations, and Kumar, Ragan and Zingales (1999) report finding larger listed firms by sales and assets when there is more reliable legal protection of investors. Finally, Fogel (2006) found that a country's dominance by oligarchic families was associated with less capable national governments and greater corruption. Here we bring research from different subfields and levels of analysis together to propose the managerial behaviours that produce these documented organizational performance effects.
Those scholars that have begun to address how relatively less capable governments affect managerial action have focused on how they drive managers to seek sufficient predictability and security to do business through their personal relationships. Redding (1990) was among the first to describe the effects of governments on managerial practices, observing that the hostile local governmental officials under Imperial China and for overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia led Chinese executives to keep their organizations small (to better hide from predatory officials) and to rely on business dealings with family and clan members (relying on personal trust relations to sustain their businesses when they could not rely on contract enforcement or rule of law). Xin and Pearce (1996) found that private business executives in China who could not rely on impersonal governmental protection were more likely to defensively cultivate personal-trust relationships with governmental officials for protection. Luo and Chung (2005) determined that in Taiwan during its early institutional transition executives with more personal relationships with the powerful had better performing firms. These scholars all argue that when governments are less capable, managers rely on their personal relationships with the powerful for the trust and predictability they need to run their organizations.
This recent research is consistent with longstanding sociological and economic scholarship asserting that impersonal legal-rational organizations produce superior performance to traditional or neo-traditional organizations dominated by personal relationships (North, 1990; Perrow, 1979; Weber, 1947) . North (1990) proposed that governments reduce unpredictability in economic exchange by establishing stable structures for interaction. Fligstein (1996 Fligstein ( , 2001 argued that stability is produced by reliably enforced written legal codes, licensing systems that can be trusted, tax money spent on roads and schools rather than deposited in officials' foreign bank accounts, and so forth. Governmental incapacity can be doubly costly -both in the absence of necessary facilitating functions and in the unpredictability of erratic, partial enforcement. The more capable the government, the less time and money managers must spend finding their own personal substitutes for these organization-supporting governmental services. Peng (2003) called this reliance on personal relationships a network-based strategy.
We test the argument that managers' reliance on personal relationships fosters less effective actions that undermine organizational innovation and efficiency. We test the argument that relatively stronger national governmental capability frees managers from dependence on their personal relationships; it allows managers to focus on maximizing organizational performance rather than on securing protection from government officials; it creates an environment in which competitive advantages accrue from better products and services rather than personal connections; and it fosters organizations with more effective internal managerial organizational behaviours.
Less capable governments and managerial dependence on personal relationships
A hallmark of stronger government capability has been the institutional arrangements that can produce impersonal transactions among strangers -when the scope of business activity expands beyond what can be accommodated by a friendship or kinship circle (Parsons and Smelser, 1956; Weber, 1947; Zucker, 1986 ). If governments cannot or do not facilitate impersonal business relationships individuals have no choice but to continue to rely on the only means available to them -the personal relationships they build themselves. This is in many ways a return to Weber's (1947) traditional practices, albeit with organizations that Walder (1986) called 'neo-traditional' because they superficially look like large legal-rational organizations but in practice operate as webs of personal obligations.
Therefore, the less capable the governments, the more personal relationships become critical to managers because they are the primary available way to build and sustain organizational work. Individuals must rely more on those they have known for a long time through youth, family or communal ties as a defence against the insecurity created by relatively less capable governments. For example, if they have no confidence in the courts, managers will restrict trade to those they personally know will not cheat them. If there is no reliable trademark protection, factory owners will make sure that only relatives have access to their designs. If bookkeepers may steal with impunity, only those whom managers personally trust may authorize payments. Although these insights are several decades old, they languished in sociology, largely ignored by management scholars until the more recent interest in managers' contexts.
Managers' dependence on personal relationships undermines firm performance in several ways. First, dependence on relationships means that these managers are not free to act impersonally, based on others' contribution to product and service quality. Further, dependence on personal relationships limits organizational size by restricting an organization's potential growth, eliminating possible economies of scale. This is because managers must keep their organizations small enough so they can personally know everyone with whom they work. Some support 502 J. L. Pearce et al.
for the increased importance of personal relationships under single-country less capable governments has been found in interviews by Pearce and Branyiczki (1997) and Whiteley et al. (1996) in transitional Hungary, and by Pearce (2001) and Hitt et al. (2006) in China. We begin by testing these arguments in our four-nation sample before building new theory from this base.
H1:
The less capable the government, the more dependent managers will be on their personal relationships with others.
Less capable governments and protection from arbitrary officials
Under less capable governments officials become a particularly critical dependence for managers. Unpredictable government officials may expropriate businesses, levy unexpected taxes and fees, and threaten one's personal safety. Gambetta (1988) observed that the capture of the powerful via personal relationships with them provided the only protection available under the incapable governments of Sicily. By contrast, those who live under the protection of capable governments are freer to work with strangers who might help with a new market or provide funds; they do not need to cling to those who can protect them from the threats posed by erratic governments unable or unwilling to control their officials. In other words, the less capable governments are of enforcing contracts and controlling local officials, the more these officials become critical dependences that managers must manage in a way that ensures the organization's survival (Hambrick, 1981; Hickson et al., 1971) . While personal relationships are useful for virtually any critical dependence, they are particularly well suited to managing the insecurity posed by less capable governments. Such environments are significantly more threatening and opaque, and so the protection and information that relationships with the powerful provide become indispensable. When government officials administer laws particularistically, rather than universally, managing those officials must take precedence over any other strategic consideration. These officials' support must be maintained if organizations are not to be mired in audits, seizures of assets, or other interference at the discretion of these officials. Such dependence relationships are managed through practices like sharing profits through partnerships, placing officials on boards of directors, paying officials 'special fees' or providing scholarships for their children to study overseas. Indirect evidence of this active cultivation of government officials under less capable governments comes from Peng and Luo (2000) and Li and Zhang (2007) who found that the executives of Chinese firms with more personal ties to government officials had greater market share and return on assets. However, board placements are only one (easily measured) way to cultivate officials, and so we directly assess whether managers report that they cultivate government officials more assiduously when working under less capable governments.
H2:
The less capable the government the more likely managers are to actively cultivate relationships with government officials.
Less capable governments and a state-capture strategy
When working under relatively less capable governments managers who have built personal relationships with the powerful have secured a powerful competitive advantage. Such well-connected managers have invested in something very valuable in these countries: the ability to shape laws and regulations, and governmental dispensations that can be used offensively as well as defensively. While less capable government undermines legal-rational efficiency, we contend that proactive managers can individually profit handsomely from their ability to influence government. Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2003) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have provided rich data on such 'state capture' under less capable governments, in which powerful business elites succeed in capturing government policy and personally favourable enforcement. Using survey data in which country nationals identified those firms widely believed to have captured government policy in a study covering 175 countries they found that firms with a statecapture strategy had higher output and investment than firms that did not have this strategy.
The ability to gain favourable treatment from government officials can be a powerful competitive advantage for captor firms, and less capable governments provide more scope for gaining How Government Capability Affects Managers these advantages. Capable governments make it more difficult for local authorities to grant favours, because officials are themselves more constrained by law (Evans and Rauch, 1999) , making managers' organizational successes more dependent on providing improved services and producing better products or more innovative business processes, rather than fostering and maintaining relationships with the politically powerful. The less capable the government the more competitive advantages can be obtained from personal support from government officials, a powerful competitive advantage, and so the more likely managers will be to try to make their organization's core strategic competence the capture of powerful government officials.
H3. The less capable the government, the more managers will proactively use their personal relationships to obtain a strategic advantage.
Less capable governments and efficiencyundermining organizational behaviours
While the above hypotheses have all been proposed (if not tested) in the international strategy literature, governmental effects on managers' internal organizational actions have not received much attention. Here we propose three distinct internal dysfunctions under less capable governments. First, if less capable governments make managers more dependent on personal relationships with government officials, managers are less able to build relationships with those who can help the organization to find a new market, be technically successful and to improve its efficiency. Managerial attention is finite, and so the less managerial attention to building relationships with those with useful product and service knowledge and skills, the less technically competent their organizations will be, and so the less able to compete based on organizational performance. Therefore, we would expect managers to have proportionally fewer important business relationships developed with those who can provide product or market technical assistance under less capable governments.
A second performance-enhancing management practice is the movement of information to those who need it (Baskin and Aronoff, 1989 ). Withholding information has long been considered a dysfunctional organizational practice, resulting in bottlenecks and decisions made without relevant information (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) . Many consider withholding information an organizationally dysfunctional political tactic used to gain power over others by making the withholder the sole necessary source of the information (Feldman, 1988; Mulder et al., 1986) . Certainly, if information is withheld, it is more likely that decisions will be made with incomplete information. In addition, if managers withhold information from others and fear that others are doing likewise, they will have little confidence that they have sufficient information to make risky decisions. Such managerial conservatism impedes decentralization and employee empowerment, since those at lower organizational levels do not have the information they need to take responsibility for decisions. Also, if specialists do not share the information they have, organizations cannot gain the benefits of specialization. Less specialization and decentralization keep organizations small, inhibit innovation, and reduce their ability to respond in complex environments.
Third, the withholding of information and other forms of secrecy are all behavioural manifestations of distrust, and trust has long been considered crucial to organizational innovation and performance. Classically, Arrow (1974) argued that trust allowed organizations to avoid costly controls. Coleman (1990) found that those who did not trust were less willing to take risks, and Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven (1997) and Bromiley and Cummings (1995) reported that those who trusted more were less likely to behave opportunistically toward others. Hardin (1993) proposed that those who do not trust limit their cooperation with others, and Shapiro (1987) argued that those who do not trust only work with those they know well. Zucker (1986) noted that the rules and hierarchy of legal-rational organizations are designed to foster a generalized trust among co-workers who do not have frequent interactions with one another, and Rao, Pearce and Xin (2005) and Pearce (2001) found greater distrust of co-workers in the less capable transition countries than in the relatively more capable USA.
To summarize, there are a constellation of dysfunctional managerial actions proposed to arise under less capable governments: fewer managerial relationships with the technically useful, more withholding of information and greater secrecy and less trust of others. These prevent the use of less costly and more flexible control systems, limiting organizational size; and result in a conservatism that makes organizations slow to develop complex innovations and respond to environmental events. We propose that such managerial actions are among the possible reasons for lower organizational performance under less capable governments documented by Fogel (2006) , Hitt et al. (2006) ; Kumar, Ragan and Zingales (1999) , La Porta et al. (2002) and Makino, Isobe and Chan (2004) .
H4. The less capable the government the more managers will engage in performance-undermining organizational behaviours of fewer relationships with the technically useful, withholding information, and distrust.
The centrality of managerial personal relationships
All of the above hypotheses posit a direct relationship between relative government capability and managerial actions. However, most theorists argue that personal relationships mediate the relationship between relative government capability and dysfunctional managerial actions. Redding (1990) proposed that when executives fear capricious government officials they sought personal relationships with others as a basis for the predictability they needed, and this dependence on personal relationships dominated their organizations. Banfield (1958) , Gambetta (1988) , Putnam (1993) and Redding (1990) all described environments in which dependence on personal relationships with the powerful was self-reinforcing. Pearce (2001) argued that dependence on personal relationships mediated the relationship between incapable government and organizational behaviours associated with ineffective organizations. Yet, while she found that these dysfunctional organizational behaviours were more prevalent in the countries with less capable governments, she did not directly test her mediation argument. Thus, to these theorists managerial dependence on personal relationships is the mediating factor between government capability and managerial practices associated with connections-dependent and poorer performing organizations. Alternatively, as described above, relative government capability may directly lead to the cultivation of government officials, relationship-dependent business strategies and dysfunctional organizational behaviours. Here we test whether or not our proposed direct relationships, or Redding's (1990) and Pearce's (2001) personal relationship mediation arguments, best explain these performancedamaging managerial organizational behaviours.
H5. The negative relationships between government capability and seeking the protection of government officials, using personal relationships for strategic advantage, and performance-undermining organizational behaviours will be mediated by managers' greater dependence on their personal relationships under less capable governments.
Methods

Government capability
The Government Capability Index for 1995 (GCI 1995) was constructed from archival data using the survey data from the World Economic Forum and the Institute for Management Development 1995 World Competitiveness Report; this year was selected to sample a wide range of government capabilities. The survey is sent to about 21,000 executives in top and middle management in all the countries covered by the Report of which more or less 20% return the completed questionnaire. The executives surveyed form a cross-section representing the business structure of their countries and rated only the country where they were currently working (World Economic Forum and Institute for Management Development, 1995) . We started with the 32 items from the 1995 IMD World Competitiveness yearbook. These items were selected to reflect the concept of relative government capability. A series of factor analyses were conducted using oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization, dropping items that cross-loaded (loaded less than 0.40 on the target factor or showed less than a 0.10 difference in loadings on more than one factor). This process resulted in two final ten-item scales with strong convergent and discriminant validity, one the GCI1995 scale. The final factor loadings for both scales appear in Appendix A, and the standardized GCI1995 scores for the 46 countries appear in Appendix B.
Managerial actions
Sample and procedure. The self-reports of dependence on personal relationships, cultivation of officials, strategic use of relationships and dysfunctional organizational behaviours were taken from a sample of 399 managers from China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan and the USA (hereafter referred to as 'the four governments') collected in 1995 to correspond to the year capability was assessed. Respondents worked as full-time supervisors and directors from a broad range of organizations and industries, including financial services, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing and medical services. In this sample, 42% worked in publicly traded companies, 32% worked in privately held and 13% worked in state-owned businesses. Their organizations ranged in size from 30,000 employees and $100 billion in total annual revenue to eight employees and $5000 in annual sales. The average age of the respondents was 31.67 years, their mean tenure in the organization was 5.31 years, and they were predominately male (71%). All of those asked to complete the surveys in class did so and were fed back comparative data for classroom discussion. To test the hypotheses, the four country GCI1995 scores are assigned to each respondent from that country. Since we cannot separate national governments from national cultures and we would expect relative governmental capability to be influenced by national culture, this sample including managers from three countries sharing Chinese culture helps give us confidence that we have at least partially isolated the effects of government capability. As can be seen in Appendix B, the three culturally Chinese locations (China, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan) have GCI1995 scores that vary more than a standard deviation from one another ( À 1.23, 0.65 and 0.13, respectively), suggesting confidence that GCI1995 measures differences in government capability, not culture.
Each respondent was asked to identify three non-subordinate business associates who were most useful to them in either solving day-to-day problems or achieving long-run career success. The respondent then answered a series of questions about each of these relationships, resulting in data on 1197 business relationships. The English version of the survey was translated into Chinese, with the back-translation indepen-dently confirmed (Brislin, 1986) . Multiple measures of each dependent variable are proposed, and then tested in a confirmatory factor analysis using structural equation modelling.
Dependence on relationships. Respondents were asked to describe the nature of their dependence on each of their business relationships. To measure dependence, the question 'How would you characterize your dependence on one another?' was asked, with respondents then choosing one of the following responses: (1) we are both very dependent on one another; (2) I depend a great deal on this associate while he/she is not very dependent on me; (3) this associate depends a great deal on me while I am not very dependent on him/her; (4) neither of us is very dependent on the other. In this study, (1) is called 'Mutual dependence' and (4) is 'Neither are dependent'; these are dummy coded and used as measures of high dependence and low dependence, respectively.
Cultivate government officials. Four measures assess the extent to which respondents cultivate government officials. The first one is a question asking respondents to characterize their most important relationships, and the respondents were given the following choices: this business associate is (1) a peer of my supervisor;
(2) a colleague or peer in this organization; (3) a colleague in another organization; (4) a customer; (5) a business partner; (6) a service provider or supplier; (7) a government official; (8) other. The measure 'Government officials' was created by a dummy coding of (7) above as 1, and all other responses were coded as 0. The second measure is the question 'What is the primary reason for this associate's usefulness?' Respondents were given the following choices: important connections (1) in government; (2) in key companies; (3) elsewhere in this organization; (4) controls financial resources; (5) access to customers; (6) technical or professional knowledge; (7) I have to go through this person. This measure is called 'Useful in managing government' and is created by dummy coding the (1) response as 1 and all other responses as 0. The third measure of the cultivation of government officials is constructed from respondents' answers to the question 'People in business relationships often give one another gifts. Could you characterize these relationships by the gift-giving between you?' Respondents were asked to choose one of the following responses: (1) this associate gives me valuable gifts; (2) this associate gives me token gifts; (3) we give each other valuable gifts; (4) we give each other token gifts; (5) I give this associate token gifts; (6) I give this associate valuable gifts; (7) we don't exchange gifts. This variable 'Give valuable gifts' is the dummy coded response to (3) and (6) above as 1 and all other responses as 0. The final measure of the cultivation of government officials seeks to capture the use of relationships with government officials to manage threats, and is called 'Useful in managing threats'. It consists of responses to the question 'My relationship with this associate is useful to me as defence against unexpected threats' on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 5 strongly disagree to 5 5 strongly agree.
Strategic use of personal relationships. Four measures assess the use of managers' most important personal relationships for strategic advantage. Three were developed from the question 'The last time you asked this associate for assistance, could you indicate which of the following circumstances describe that situation?' Respondents were asked to choose from the following responses: (1) obtain capital/money; (2) obtain an 'exception' to a rule or policy; (3) obtain customers. Each of the three responses is dummy coded, to create three different variables, in order 'Useful to obtain capital', 'Useful to obtain government dispensations' and 'Useful to obtain customers'. The fourth measure of the strategic use of relationships, called 'Useful in the expansion of the business', is built from their answer to the question 'My relationship with this associate is useful to me in the expansion of my organization's business', rated on a fivepoint Likert scale with 1 5 strongly disagree to 5 5 strongly agree.
Dysfunctional organizational behaviours. Measures of the dysfunctional managerial organizational behaviours are based on six different questions. Relationship with technically capable associates was assessed with two questions. 'Useful in providing technical advice' was based on the question 'The last time you asked this associate for assistance, could you indicate which of the following circumstances describe that situation?' One of the responses is 'provide direction or guidance' with 'no' coded 1 and 'yes' coded 0 (reverse coded because it reflects a use of relationships to improve technical performance). The second measure, 'Capable people in network', is created from the question 'How many highly capable people are included in your network of business associates?', reverse coded to 1 5 all are highly capable to 7 5 none is capable. There are three measures of the extent of withholding information. The first, 'I withhold information', is taken from the question 'Do you ever withhold information from this associate that he/she might be interested in?' This is dummy coded 'yes' (coded 2) and 'no' (coded 1). 'Other withholds information' is taken from the question 'Do you suspect this associate might be withholding information from you that you might be interested in?' Three choices were given: 'yes' (coded 3), 'not sure' (coded 2) and 'no' (coded 1). Finally, 'Relationship secret' is created from 'How open is your relationship with this associate?' Respondents were asked to choose one of three responses: 'The relationship is public knowledge' (coded 1), 'The relationship is known in our circle of business associates' (coded 2), and 'We keep the relationship private' (coded 3). Finally, 'Distrust' is measured by the response to the question 'To what extent do you trust this associate?' reverse coded here as 1 5 strongly agree to 5 5 strongly disagree. Table 1 contains the means, standard deviations, ranges and intercorrelations among all variables used in the initial measurement model.
Analyses and results
To test the hypotheses we have data at three levels of analysis: government (n 5 4), managerial respondents (n 5 399) and managers' most important business relationships (n 5 1187). Hierarchical linear modelling, allowing analyses at all three levels simultaneously, is inappropriate due to the small sample size at the government level (Snijders and Bosker, 2002) . In order to test whether the non-independence of the relationship-level data precluded hypothesis testing at this level we conducted a within-and-between analysis (Dansereau, Alutto and Yammarino, 1984; Yammarino and Markham, 1992) . The corrected F from the within-and-between analysis was non-significant for all self-report variables Anderson and Gerbing (1988) was conducted. First, we performed confirmatory factor analyses to assess the adequacy of the proposed measurement model. Then, we tested our hypotheses through an evaluation of three alternative structural models: Model 1 with dependence partially mediating the relationships between government capability, cultivation of officials, strategic use of relationships and dysfunctional organizational behaviours (the least constrained of the hypothesized models), tested against the more constrained Model 2, in which dependence on relationships fully mediates the relationship between government capability and the dysfunctional organizational practices, and the most constrained Model 3 with only direct paths between government capability and dependence on relationships, cultivation of officials, relationship-based strategies and dysfunctional organizational behaviours. In our analysis, we partitioned the total effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable into direct and indirect components in the mediation models (Brown, 1997) . A significant indirect effect indicates that a mediator reduces the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The initial measurement model consists of the observed variables predicted by corresponding underlying first-order factors (i.e. dependence on relationships, cultivation of officials, relationshipbased business strategies, and inefficiency). Allowing the error terms for the items for each latent variable to co-vary, fit index values showed that three of the measures needed to be dropped. The factor loading of item 'Give valuable gifts' was not significant, and thus this item was dropped. The item 'Useful in managing threats' had a very low factor-loading on Cultivate Officials (0.15) and so it was deleted. The item 'Useful to obtain capital' had negative error variance and a factor loading more than 1, and thus it was dropped. These variables may have failed because they were expected to predict Cultivate Officials but did not directly ask about government officials. After dropping these three measures all of the models fit the data well (see Figure 1 ). All factor loadings for the measurement model were significant at the po0.01 level.
The second major step in our analysis involves creating a series of four structural models to test our hypotheses. The first model is the fully saturated one. Comparing our least-constrained (partial mediation) Model 1 to the fully saturated model we find that the root mean square error of approximation increases from 0.048 to 0.049; thus, our more constrained Model 1 is a better fit to the data. For this reason all subsequent models are compared with the theoretically plausible Model 1 rather than the atheoretical fully saturated model. Models 1, 2 and 3 are shown in Figure 1 . Table 2 shows the tests of the w 2 changes comparing the least-constrained (partial mediation) Model 1 to the less constrained (full mediation) Model 2, and also the w 2 changes comparing Model 1 to the most constrained (direct relationships) Model 3.
As can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 2 all models are excellent fits to the data with goodness of fit index, non-normed fit index and comparative fit index for all three models ! 0.99. We used a w 2 difference test to determine whether there was a significant difference in the w 2 between the more constrained Models 2 and 3 and the less constrained Model 1. However, with such a large n 5 1187 even the comparatively modest changes in w 2 all reach statistical significance. Further, Table 3 shows that Model 1 and Model 3 have some paths which do not reach statistical significance. Therefore, we conclude that Model 2 is the best fit and that all hypotheses have been supported. We found a negative relationship between relative government capability and managers' active cultivation of personal relationships, managers' use of these relationships for a strategic advantage, and their reports of the dysfunctional actions of relationships with technically incapable associates, withholding information and distrust. These relationships are fully mediated by managers' dependence on relationships.
These results are consistent with what managers working under these different governments told us. For example, managers working under the most capable government in our sample (USA) had trouble answering questions asking them if the relationship 'was secret'. It simply did not make sense to them; they would frown, look puzzled and then say something like, 'Well a lot of people may not know about the relationship, because they don't care'. In contrast, to the managers working under our least capable government (Mainland China) the question made perfect sense, and many of them described why they needed to keep certain relationships (particularly with government officials) secret to protect their connection from charges of corrup-tion. In another example, the managers working under the least capable government would go on to describe how they had to be careful who they invited to their New Years' banquets (an important time to cultivate business relationships in China), to be sure that their governmentofficial relationships were not invited to the same banquet as those whom they could not trust not to use knowledge of that relationship against them or the official. Managing personal relationships is a very demanding, highly labour intensive How Government Capability Affects Managers 511 Note: Path coefficients are standardized weighted least squares estimates. All reported path coefficients are significant at po0.01; those not reported are not significant. N 5 1197. F, direct effect of GCI; -. indirect effect of GCI; to simplify the presentation, the measurement model and the disturbance errors effects are not shown.
df, degrees of freedom; GFI, goodness of fit index; NNFI, non-normed fit index; CFI, comparative fit index; AIC, Akaike information criterion; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation. and critical job for the Mainland Chinese managers in our study. In these relationships managers are expected to share important information, even secret information, with those considered insiders (Chen, 2008) . By contrast, for the American managers relationship cultivation was less important, and was usually efficiently handled through public professional and commercial association events. For our Hong Kong SAR and Taiwanese managers, relationship management fell between these two extremesthey were not as critical to personal and organizational success as they were for the Mainland Chinese managers, but these non-Mainland Chinese managers still invested heavily in relationships, perhaps as a residual cultural practice rather than as a functional management task.
Discussion
Here a theory of how government capability affects the managerial attitudes and behaviours necessary to innovative, high-performing large organizations was proposed and empirically tested in a sample of managers working under four governments varying in their capabilities. We provided evidence that government capability predicts less managerial dependence on personal relationships for job and career success, less cultivation of relationships with government officials rather than technically useful relationships, less proactive use of personal relationships for strategic reasons, and less organizationally dysfunctional distrust, secrecy and the withholding of information. The results are strong, with the preponderance of evidence supporting managers' dependence on their relationships as mediating between government capability and managerial perceptions and actions that foster better organizational performance.
Cultivation of officials and the pursuit of relationship-based strategies
The poorer the government capability the more likely managers were to build relationships with government officials and to rely on their most important work relationships for assistance in obtaining government favours, and the less likely they were to rely on them to find customers or to aid in business expansion. All of these reflect the use of such corporate strategies, and support Peng's (2003) theorizing about the costs of relationship-based strategies. They also provide strong cross-national comparative evidence for Xin and Pearce's (1996) claim that relatively less capable governments drive managers to rely on relationships with government officials as substitutes for the predictability provided by capable governments. These data support the claim that dependence on relationships is not necessarily the result of managers' cultures or personal sociability, but is a sensible way to manage when governments do not provide the security and infrastructure managers need.
International management research has documented that relationship-based strategies are more prevalent in countries with less capable governments and result in better organizational performance in those jurisdictions. There is growing evidence that relationship-based management is inherently self-limiting. Hitt et al. (2006) found that the greater executives' reliance on relationships with government officials for competitive advantages the poorer their performance. Under less capable governments complex organizations cannot easily grow in size (since that would depend on delegation), and any attempts to expand into other regions or nations would require a laborious building of a new network of officials, suppliers and customers. Following organizational theory, these strategies should make it difficult for these organizations to perform well when competing on their performance outside the settings where their managers have built their personal relationships. A focus on managerial behaviour helps highlight how limiting these strategies are when working under capable governments. First, it takes a great deal of time to build and sustain personal relationships, which necessarily means that their organizations are restricted to those areas where managers have invested in those relationships. While managers may have developed general relationship-cultivation skills, each relationship is very labour intensive to establish and to sustain, so these skills do not travel well. Such relationship-based strategies may succeed in keeping foreign competitors at bay when governments are less capable (see Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2005) , but they come at the cost of keeping organizations localized and dependent on government officials (see also Chen, Fan and Wong, 2006) . Building on Drori, Jang and Meyer (2006) who found that greater out-nation linkages drove the rationalization of governments, relationship-based firm strategies seem to promise limited economic development, especially that arising from innovative complex organizations.
Dysfunctional organizational behaviours
We also found that the less capable the government the less likely managers were to rely on their relationships for useful technical advice, and the more likely they were to believe their associates withheld information from them (and to withhold information from them in turn), and to distrust their most important associates, all consistent with the predictions about the effects of weak government capability on dysfunctional organizational behaviours.
Withholding information and distrust have been associated with poorer organizational performance. They reduce organizational speed and flexibility, require the use of more costly and less flexible control systems, and reduce attention to projects and investments with longer term payoffs. These managerial attitudes, perceptions and actions make for passive organizations slow to innovate and respond to external shocks. Based on what we know from the organizational behaviour literature, managers who distrust their closest business associates would not be expected to build large, decentralized organizations and so gain the advantages of specialization, scale and scope.
Managerial actions, economic development, and the maturing of management research
Attention to the role of managerial attitudes and expectations that support organizational performance suggests policy implications for economic development, and reflects the growing interest in how management research can address societal challenges. Economists and sociologists have long reported that capable governments are important to economic development. However, when these scholars address why, they focus on individuals, implying that autonomous individuals, not those running and working throughout large organizations, should be the focus of policy. If organizations and their managers do matter, then policies need to address them as well. For example, policies to foster large 'national cham-pions' help create a cadre of expert middle managers and professionals. However, as long as large organizations are dependent on government favour, these middle managers and professionals are constrained in their abilities to leave and found and grow their own spin-off organizations, the basis of innovative clusters like California's Silicon Valley. Policies fostering economic development need to attend to how organizations can be founded and grow large based on producing better products and services, not just on incentives for individuals. Despite popular press praise of the rapid growth in some developing countries, the richest countries still are those with large organizations that compete based on performance, not favours from the powerful.
Limitations
This research has limitations. We developed plausible theory from literature that was supported, but the theory remains incomplete. For example, there probably are numerous other managerial beliefs and behaviours affected by relative government capability not tested here. For example, Pearce, Dibble and Klein (2009) have recently argued that government incapability has especially deleterious effects on technology-based entrepreneurship, and a more detailed analysis of the role of government capability on innovation and entrepreneurship is needed. Further, because the data depend on managers working under only four governments, we would want to see research extended to other countries to be more confident of the conclusions. Finally, the theory proposed was causal, but it was tested using data from one time period. Future research could capitalize on the recent changes in national governance to test the effects of changes in governance capability on organizational growth and development.
Conclusions
Managerial research has matured in the past 25 years in many ways, and here we build on two of those developments. First, managerial research has moved beyond a manager-flattering view of managers as autonomous agents, in control of their destinies. Increasingly research sees managers as operating in complex contexts and has begun to deconstruct and understand those contexts as drivers of managerial action. Here we focused on the governmental context and found that managerial reports are consistent with many of the speculations of institutional theorists about why large, complex, innovative organizations grow and prosper in some countries but not others. Second, we contend that managerial research has developed a large body of knowledge that is useful in addressing questions other than their original focus on business and individual managers' success. In the past 25 years managerial research has produced increasingly sophisticated knowledge about the operation of organizations, information that is useful in addressing a broad number of societal challenges. We illustrated these developments with this study of governmental effects on what managers do to try to manage under relatively less capable governments. We look forward to what awaits us in the next 25 years. 
